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G.E.M. Anscombe famously claimed that ‘the Hebrew–Christian ethic’ dif-
fers from consequentialist normative theories in its ability to ground the
claim that killing the innocent is intrinsically wrong.1 The legal character of
this ethic, rooted in the divine decrees of the Torah, confers a particular
moral sense of ‘ought’ by which this and other act-types can be ‘wrong’
regardless of their consequences, she maintained.2
There is, of course, a potentially devastating counter-example to
Anscombe’s characterization. Within the Torah, Abraham is apparently
commanded by God to slaughter and set fire to his innocent son, Isaac.3
For attempting to do so, he is praised in the Biblical passage and by later
Jewish and Christian commentators.4 The case cannot be dismissed imme-
diately as uncharacteristic of the ‘Hebrew–Christian ethic’; Abraham and
1 Anscombe 1958: 10, 19. E.g., ‘For it has been characteristic of that ethic [=Hebrew–
Christian] to teach that there are certain things forbidden whatever consequences
threaten, such as: choosing to kill the innocent for any purpose, however good . . .
the prohibition of certain things simply in virtue of their description of such-and-
such identifiable kinds of action, regardless of any further consequences, is certainly
not the whole of the Hebrew–Christian ethic, but it is a noteworthy feature of
it’ (10).
2 Anscombe 1958: 5–6, 10. E.g., ‘ . . . Christianity, with its law conception of ethics. For
Christianity derived its ethical notions from the Torah’ (5). Anscombe initially says
that a law conception of ethics can in principle arise without belief in divine positive
law (1958: 5, citing the Stoics), but later that it requires belief in God as a law-giver,
comparing it to positive criminal law (1958: 6; strangely, she includes the Stoics
again).
3 Genesis 22:2. Regarding my qualifier ‘apparently’, see the second half of the section
‘Conceptual Parameters’ below.
4 Genesis 22:16–17; Hebrews 11:17–19; James 2:21–3; sections ‘Conceptual Parameters’
(second half) and ‘Early Christian Analyses’ below.
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Isaac are central figures in the Torah, which contains additional instances of
God or Moses commanding the killing of civilians, including children.5
It would appear, then, that Anscombe is mistaken factually, about what the
historical ‘Hebrew–Christian ethic’ taught, and in her conceptual claim that
the role of law in this ethic is to ground stable content. Seemingly, killing the
innocent was considered justified when it was done in order to propitiate
God. And while it is true that defining ‘right’ action as ‘lawful’ action will
ensure that the consequences of an act cannot alter its moral rightness, this
will not by itself guarantee that certain act-types are always unlawful. Indeed,
the content of decrees in the Torah appears inconstant. Although the Torah
does, as Anscombe says, portray God as proscribing the killing of innocent
human beings,6 it also recounts God’s contradictory command to kill Isaac
and subsequent countermand not to kill Isaac after all.7
Christian authors from the third to the fifth centuries, some of whomwere
in contact with rabbinic glosses, addressed this Biblical story. A survey of
their analyses will showcase the development of normative theory during
this period, and allow us to assess more fully Anscombe’s characterization of
the ‘Hebrew–Christian ethic’.
CONCEPTUAL PARAMETERS
The various early Christian commentaries invite comparisons with Plato’s
Euthyphro – where the conceptual question of the gods’ relation to morality
was famously raised – and with rabbinic interpretations of the episode.
Although the Christian authors rarely cite the Euthyphro by name,8 we
frequently find them employing concepts discussed there. These parallels,
rather than questions of direct textual transmission, are the objects of my
focus. Similarly for the rabbinic background: I will concentrate on relevant
shared content, only alluding to Quellenforschung in passing.
5 Deuteronomy 7:1–2, 20:16–18; Numbers 31:7–18. Cf. Dawkins 2006: 31.
6 Exodus 23:7 (‘Do not kill the innocent’; cf. Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17);
‘innocent’ indicates non-murderers or non-attackers (e.g. Genesis 9:5–6; Exodus
22:2; Jeremiah 2:34).
7 Genesis 22:12.
8 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 13.4 (quoting Euthyphro 6a–c). The lack of
frequent references is not surprising given the relaxed approach to citation in
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It should have occurred to any classically educated early Christian writer
who knew the Euthyphro to evaluate the Abraham–Isaac episode in light of
the notions of piety, justice, and normativity discussed by Plato. Both texts
deal with the killing of an innocent or possible innocent, and both contrapose
piety toward God or the gods with the attempted killing of a family member.9
There are two senses of ‘piety’ in the Euthyphro, which we might call
particular and general piety. Both are employed in analyses of the Abraham–
Isaac episode during late antiquity.
We find particular piety, that is, the proper ritual worship of the gods,
discussed at the end of the dialogue. Euthyphro and Socrates agree that these
pious acts are just, though not every just act is pious (11e–14e). Similarly, it is a
commonplace amongst authors in late antiquity – Christian and pagan – that
the particular virtue of piety is a species of the virtue of justice.10 ‘Justice’ is
often defined in this later period as giving what is due: hence piety is giving
due worship to God or to the gods. There is a similar understanding, without
an explicit analysis into genus and species, in rabbinic commentaries redacted
in late antiquity,11 as we shall see later in this section.
General piety is the main focus of the Euthyphro, and will receive most
of our attention. Socrates and Euthyphro agree that the morally good is
what the gods love (7d–e; cf. 5d). And being pious is defined as doing
what the gods love (6e–7a). It follows that being pious is doing what is
morally good. ‘Piety’ in this sense is not a special virtue amongst others,
or a species of some one virtue. Rather, whoever is a thoroughly good
person is pious and vice versa.
This general sense of ‘piety’ is in play when Socrates raises the problem of
metaphysical ground. Are actions good independently of the gods’ loving
them, in recognition of which the gods love them, or are they good because
they happen to be beloved of the gods (10a)?
9 Euthyphro charges his father with intentional homicide, a capital offense, for
killing-by-neglect a servant who killed a slave while drunk. The father’s guilt is
disputed as is (Plato seems to imply) the servant’s, given his drunkenness
(Euthyphro 4b–e, 9a; MacDowell 1963: 45–6, 59–60, 110–21; Phillips 2007: 89–90, 99;
Phillips 2013: 89–90; Plato, Laws 865a–874d). Isaac appears to be innocent of any
crime when his father attempts to kill him.
10 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 1.116, 2.153; Cicero, On Goals 5.23.65; Apuleius, On
Plato and his Philosophy 2.7; Basil of Caesarea, Rule Q. 170; Ambrose, On Duties
1.27.127. Cf. Jones 2006; Mikalson 2010: 196.
11 Genesis Rabbah (GRab.), believed to have been redacted c. 400–450 CE.
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Since Socrates and Euthyphro agree that the gods’ loves are belief-based
(hêgountai, 7e), and also that the gods are not mistaken,12 the philosophical
question raised here is: why are the gods’ beliefs not mistaken? Either (1)
because the gods perceive accurately what is good in itself, owing to their
mental acuity, or (2) because the mere opinion of the gods is determinative of
what is good. Socrates’ question therefore bears comparison with the debate
about whether ‘knowledge’ – including ethical knowledge13 – ‘is simply
perception’, in Theaetetus 151e–183c. ‘Knowledge is simply perception’, we
are told, asserts that opinion (doxa) is knowledge: each individual’s experi-
ence and belief is the criterion or ‘measure’ of truth (152a, 152c, 161d–e, 178b).
Socrates’ option (2) in Euthyphro 10a would say this of the gods’ perceptions,
whereas (1) would deny it. Socrates is of course presented as favoring (1). As a
shorthand way of referring to (1) and (2), it will be useful to employ
Kretzmann’s nomenclature: Theological Objectivism (TO)14 and
Theological Subjectivism (TS), respectively.15
In the Euthyphro, the violation of the principle of non-contradiction
entailed by TS when multiple divine perceivers simultaneously hold contra-
dictory opinions about the same thing16 is avoided by stipulating that the gods
are in perfect agreement (9d). This effectively reduces the number of divine
perceivers to one. But it remains an implication of TS that there is no such
thing as an intrinsically evil act.17 For it also follows from the perception
theory (and TS) that when the opinion of a single perceiver (here, the set of
gods) changes, an act-type must shift from being good to not-good or the
reverse.18 This is the outstanding issue in the Euthyphro, given that the gods’
opinions are not said to be immutable.
This brings us back to the Torah’s successively contradictory divine
commands. Although the commands might seem to suggest a voluntaristic
God without comparison to Socrates’ and Euthyphro’s intellectualist gods, in
the Hebrew Bible divine commands about child sacrifice are said to be based
on God’s thoughts,19 and in the Socratic dialogues, the gods are presented as
commanding.20 More importantly, philosophically TS requires divine
12 Cf. Evans 2012: 28. 13 Theaetetus 157d, 167c, 172b.
14 For the variant ‘internalist TO’, see the Conclusions.
15 Kretzmann 1983: 35, though his TS is not intellectualist.
16 Euthyphro 7b–8b; Theaetetus 152b, 171b. 17 Cf. Theaetetus 157d.
18 Euthyphro 6a–c on the changeable Homeric gods; Theaetetus 152d–e, 172b.
19 Jeremiah 19:5, dienoêthên (the extant Greek text is believed to be older than the
Masoretic text).
20 Apology 28e, 29d.
Early Christian Ethics
115
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139519267.010
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Boston College, on 30 Aug 2018 at 14:35:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
commands, and TO allows for them. Because perception and opinion are by
definition perspectival and personal,21 in TS the only way for non-gods to
know what the moral status of an action is, is for the gods to tell them. And
since the gods’ opinions are merely asserted to be right, not justified by any
publicly accessible intelligible features of the world, this ‘telling’ cannot be an
explanation of how or why an act is good or bad,22 but must be simply a
statement of what is to be done, a command. In a TO universe, anyone with
sufficient mental acuity could in principle know acts’ moral statuses and the
reasons why they are good or bad; but commands could nevertheless be
useful as instruction for those who happen to be ignorant, or to remind and
encourage those who already know. Of these two roles for law, the TO
model seems implied by the general disapproval of murder in Genesis 9:5–6
insofar as this text offers an explanation of whymurder is wrong, namely that
humans are in the image of God.
Turning to rabbinic interpretations of the divine command to kill Isaac, we
find that they do not advocate TS. First of all, they conceive of the would-be
action of killing Isaac as the pious offering of ‘first-fruits’23 – Isaac being the
first produce of the marriage of Abraham and Sarah – and thus as an instance
of the general moral duty to pay back what is owed.24 We can now see the
similarity to Christian and pagan accounts that define piety as a kind of
justice, giving to God what is due. The rabbis do not think the killing of
Isaac is justified on consequentialist grounds, to return to Anscombe’s con-
cern. Nor is its justice or injustice dependent on changing divine opinions and
commands. Instead, it is just in itself because Isaac is God’s. When in Genesis
22:12 God ultimately excuses Abraham from repaying this debt, it is mercy.
We may not understand why God calls in his debts in some cases and not
others, but there is no real conflict with morality – so this reasoning goes.
Of course, this rationale fails to address the divergence between the
Torah’s murder prohibitions, and the initial divine command that Abraham
kill Isaac. Justice is at issue here, for the Biblical passages which stipulate that
innocents may not be killed but non-innocents may be25 imply that killing the
innocent is wrong because it is unfair.
21 Theaetetus 160c. 22 Theaetetus 161d–e.
23 GRab. 22.5 (re Genesis 4:3–4); Genesis 22:2; Exodus 22:29–30; Deuteronomy 18:4;
Leviticus 20:1–8.
24 E.g. Psalm 37:21. The rationale for first-fruits is that God, the maker of the earth, is
the rightful ‘owner’ of all produce; first-fruits signify gratitude and recognition of
this dominion.
25 See note 6.
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More interestingly, some of the rabbinic commentary – which is not
homogenous – alleges that God never commanded Abraham to kill Isaac.
This exegetical tradition argues that Abrahammisunderstood the verb alah in
the command he received, taking it to mean ‘offer [send up in smoke] him there
as an offering’ when he should have understood God to say ‘make him [Isaac]
ascend there for an offering.’ In other words, Abrahamwas actually being told
to take Isaac up themountain so that the two could sacrifice there some other
thing.26 Since the former reading accords with the conventions of Hebrew
syntax and semantics (the sense of the verb is indicated by the presence of the
cognate ‘as an offering’ (olah)),27 these rabbis are choosing to disregard
grammatical convention to arrive at a theologically acceptable interpretation.
We might expect that their motivation here was to make the story
consonant with the Torah’s moral law, much as Kant later claimed that if
an Abraham were apparently commanded to kill an Isaac, the command
would have to be illusory, given its conflict with the moral law.28 But in fact
they do not invoke the prohibitions on murder in support of their exegesis.
Instead, they decry the ‘unnaturalness’ of a father killing his own son, note
that a command to kill Isaac would contradict the divine promise of a lineage
through Isaac, and observe that in Genesis Abraham assures the bystanders
that Isaac will return with him from the sacrifice.29
EARLY CHRISTIAN ANALYSES
Turning now to the early Christians, we find a repeated identification of the
Abraham–Isaac case as an instance of ‘killing a relative’ (parricidium), which is
also the feature emphasized as salient in the Euthyphromurder case. Some of
these Christian authors engage the notion of particular piety, examining
whether the sacrifice of Isaac would be worship owed to God. Most centrally,
however, these writers care about general piety and ‘justice’ in the sense of
general righteousness, asking whether Abraham acted morally correctly in
carrying out God’s command to kill Isaac.30 On the normative question –
whether God’s conflicting commands signify that actions become pious from
26 GRab. 56.2, GRab. 56.8. Cf. Kalimi 2010: 5.
27 Thanks to David Vanderhooft for consultation on the Hebrew.
28 The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Gregor 1979: 115.
29 Respectively: GRab. 56.5; GRab. 56.8 and GRab. 56.10 (cf. Genesis 17:15–19); GRab.
56.2 (re Genesis 22:5).
30 Origen is an exception; he reads the story figuratively but not morally (Homilies on
Genesis 8.6–7; cf. GRab. 56.3 and 56.9). Cf. Cavadini 2002.
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not-pious, and just from not-just – the texts fall into three groups: employ-
ment of what we have called TS, ambiguity or vacillation between TS and
TO, and endorsement of TO. These approaches are not necessarily mutually
exclusive for a given author; some writers change their minds.
Ambrose apparently subscribes to a TS position in the year 393. Arguing
that a command from God makes honorable what would ordinarily be a
dishonorable act (obprobrium, turpitudo), he asks rhetorically, ‘Could he31
believe that to be dishonorable (turpe) which God enjoined? . . . Abraham
. . . received a very great reward, because he believed that at God’s com-
mand, even the killing of a relative might be piously (pie) carried out’ (Letters
6.27.14).32
In the category of ambiguous accounts, we have a number of texts.
Cyprian of Carthage (martyred 258) says that Abraham is among the morally
righteous (iusti) because he was prepared to kill a relative in order to please
God (On Mortality 12).33 Yet later in the same text, he avers that ‘God does not
ask for our blood, but for our faith. For neither Abraham, nor Isaac, nor Jacob
were slain’ (18).34 Does Cyprian think that God consistently does not want
this kind of act because it is intrinsically wrong (TO) and that Abraham was
ignorant of this, but nevertheless morally praiseworthy because he had a
good intention? Or does Cyprian mean that although God happens not to
want human blood, he could have wanted it, in which case it would have
been just to kill Isaac (TS), and that Abraham was praiseworthy because he
recognized that TS is true? Similarly, Ambrosiaster (active c. 375–400) asserts
that God did not desire Isaac’s blood, but also that Abraham’s justice (iustitia)
was increased by his attempt to kill Isaac and by his belief that God wanted
Abraham to kill a relative despite God’s previous threat to punish homicide
(homicidium).35 Again, Chrysostom’s Homily on Genesis (c. 385–398) states that
God did not intend (oude thelôn, 47.11–12) for Isaac to be killed, citing the
conclusion of the story, while it praises Abraham’s belief (hê gnômê) that God
did want it, and intention (hê prohairesis) to cut his child’s throat (47.17; cf.
47.5–6, 47.9). In sum, these analyses praise Abraham for being committed to
what we have called TS, while stating that God did not want the killing of
Isaac, leaving it unclear whether God did not want it because killing the
innocent is intrinsically wrong.
31 Isaiah (Ambrose compares his commanded indecent exposure to Abraham’s com-
manded killing).
32 Trans. Walford 1881 (therein numbered Letter 58), amended.
33 Cf. The Good of Patience 10. 34 Trans. Wallis 1868.
35 Questions on the Old and New Testament (Quest.) 43.2; 117.6 (alluding to Genesis 4:15).
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Worse than ambiguous is Ambrose’s self-contradictory gloss in his eulogy
for his brother (dated 379). Here he claims that Abraham ‘knew’ (sciebat) – not
just believed – both that ‘his son would be more acceptable to God when
sacrificed than when whole (sanum)’ and that ‘God is appeased not by blood but
by dutiful obedience . . . and so Abraham was not stained with his son’s
blood’ (On the Passing of Brother Satyrus 2.97–8, my emphasis).36
None of these authors cites the Torah’s prohibition on killing the innocent
as relevant to Isaac. In the case of Cyprian, this seems to be because he
generally reserves the descriptor ‘innocent’ for Christ and the martyrs, on the
grounds that they are the paradigmatic and ‘truly’ innocent ones. But while
Ambrose and Ambrosiaster sometimes repeat this prophetic interpretation of
Exodus 23:7, they do employ the wider sense of ‘innocent’ as ‘non-aggressor’
elsewhere in their writings. They just do not apply it to Isaac. Apparently they
believe that if God commanded the slaying of Isaac, it could not be wrong to
do it, and any investigation of how it could be right would be merely
academic.
More sophisticated is Augustine, though he too is ambiguous from 397 to
at least 413.37Here we see him attempting to remain faithful to earlier exegesis
while using a form of what we have called TO. Like Ambrose, Augustine
asserts in Sermon 8 that killing a relative, which would have been cruelty if
undertaken without a command, became (facta est) piety when God com-
manded it (8.14). However, Augustine strikes out on his own when he
gestures toward a rationale for how the command was just. He cites the
Israelites’ taking booty from the Egyptians at the command of Moses during
the exodus,38 mentioning that ‘perhaps’ (forte) this was not stealing but the
recouping of a wage owed to the Israelites for their slave labor (8.16). The
parallel with Isaac is not spelled out, but presumably it is that Isaac was not
actually innocent, just as the Egyptians did not rightfully own what the
Israelites took.
Additional detail is available in the Against Faustus. Here Augustine classi-
fies the killing of Isaac as a deed ‘placed in a middle position’ (medio quodam
loco) between good and bad by the ‘eternal law’ (22.73). That is, the act-type
killing is in itself indifferent morally, and becomes right or wrong owing to
one’s intention, or the circumstances (22.71–8).39 (Note how this anticipates
36 Trans. Romestin 1896.
37 Sermon 8, c. 400–411; Against Faustus, c. 397–405; Confessions, c. 397–401; City of God
(City, begun 413), 1.21, 1.26.
38 Exodus 12:35. 39 Cf. Confessions 3.7.13–3.8.16.
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Aquinas’ division of acts into object, end, and circumstances, and his stipula-
tion that a defect in any of these renders an action wrong.)40 If, Augustine
says, Abraham had undertaken to kill Isaac of his own initiative rather than in
obedience to a divine command, the motive would have been cruelty and
hence the act would have been wrong (22.73).41 This motive could have
rendered the act morally wrong even if the act-type was correct in itself (res
recta) (22.74). Regarding the circumstances, Augustine implies that Isaac was
not innocent, comparing Abraham’s killing of him to killing the enemy in a
justified war. God has superior knowledge of who is guilty, and the best
moment for their punishment (22.71–5). Apparently, then, Augustine thinks
that Isaac had done something deserving of death, which is unknown to us.
Similarly, the Egyptians deserved to have things taken from them as the
recouping of a wage (22.71), though the Israelites did not realize this until
Moses commanded them to do it.
Clearly Augustine is attempting a version of what we are calling TO; yet
there is, simultaneously, an insistence on the necessity of the command for
the act’s liceity, which savors of TS. In keeping with TO, he argues that God’s
global view of the situation allows him to see how justice is to be applied in
each case. It follows that if humans had such epistemic prowess, they could
decide correctly in each situation, rendering commands from God unneces-
sary. But Augustine also insists that humans are incapable of knowing the
relevant circumstances (22.72, solus Deus novit), which strains credibility. That
the Israelites’ labor deserved recompense from the Egyptians is easily inferred
from a basic notion of fairness; and if Isaac had done something that merited
capital punishment, surely his father could have known about it.42
Apparently Augustine asserts universal invincible ignorance merely to
make the command somehow necessary, out of loyalty to earlier exegetes’
friendliness toward TS.
It is worth remarking how these early Christians’ conflict of loyalty to TS
and TO differs from the dichotomous model proposed by Kierkegaard. If we
take Kierkegaard at his word, he thinks that the divine command to kill Isaac
imposes an absolute religious duty to obey God, which has precedence over
and thus can ‘suspend’ morality, ‘reducing’ universal moral norms ‘to the
relative’ while they remain ethical duties.43 So the command does not render
40 Summa theologiae IaIIae Q. 18. 41 Cf. City 1.21, 1.26.
42 Possibly Augustine assumes Isaac’s sharing in the corporate human guilt of the
original sin; but he fails to say so.
43 Fear and Trembling, trans. Hannay 1985: 60, 98.
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what would otherwise be unethical ethical, nor is the command justified by
its conformity to objective criteria of justice. Rather, in such a case an
unethical act is pious. That scenario cannot arise for our authors, for whom
obeying divine commands always coincides with moral righteousness (via
either TS or TO), and particular piety falls within the class of morally just
actions.
We finally come to an analysis of the Isaac story that approximates
Anscombe’s ‘Hebrew–Christian ethic’ in Augustine’s Questions on the
Heptateuch 7.49 (dated 419–420). Bringing to the fore the apparently conse-
quentialist rationale for sacrificing Isaac, Augustine asks whether the story of
Abraham and its near-parallel, the tale of Jephthah,44 signify that human
sacrifice is acceptable for the sake of an eternal reward from God. He
emphatically answers that on the contrary, God ‘hates this kind of sacrifice’
(odisse talia sacrificia), citing the general prohibitions on child-sacrifice else-
where in the Torah,45 and the climactic divine command not to kill Isaac.
Although Augustine does not quote the more general Biblical prohibitions on
killing innocent humans, he implies that these are the grounding principles
when he says that this story about child sacrifice shows that God does not
want human sacrifice (hominis immolatio). Why, then, did God order Abraham
to offer up his son? It served to create a teaching moment. By dramatically
preventing the sacrifice of a human being, God shows (ostendit), prior to the
Mosaic Law’s prohibition, that it is wrong. The lesson was needed because
Abraham, the first Jew, was surrounded by religions that normally sacrificed
children.46 The episode also taught particular piety by instituting the ‘buying
back’ ritual for human first-fruits (codified later),47 with the ram being the
substitute sacrifice.48
Augustine’s exegesis here must be indebted to Ambrose’s On Virginity
2.5–9 (written 377–384),49 but he improves upon it. According to On Virginity,
the Isaac episode was a divine pedagogy (exemplum) given because people
were ignorant of the status of human sacrifice. It taught (docuit) that God
does not approve of killing one’s child (parricidium), and that firstborn
children should be dedicated to God, though not as holocausts. Ambrose
44 Jephthah sacrificed his daughter in fulfillment of a vow (Judges 11:30–9).
45 Quoting Deuteronomy 12:29–31, alluding to ‘many others.’
46 Deuteronomy 12:29–31, cited by Augustine, on the Canaanites west of the Jordan
(=Abraham’s home in Genesis 22:2–12); cf. Deuteronomy 18:10; Jeremiah 7:18, 4:31,
7:31–2; Xella et al. 2013; Smith et al. 2013. On child sacrifice to the Ammonite god
Molech (east of the Jordan), see 1 Kings 11:7, 2 Kings 23:10, Leviticus 18:21.
47 Exodus 13:13, 13:15. 48 Genesis 22:13. 49 Adkin 2003: 32 n. 15, 387.
Early Christian Ethics
121
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139519267.010
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Boston College, on 30 Aug 2018 at 14:35:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
here implies that God never intended for Isaac to be killed, a gloss which he
probably owes to the rabbis.50 However, Ambrose backtracks, calling into
doubt whether he thinks God opposes child sacrifice because it is objectively
unjust. He claims that God’s cancellation of the killing of Isaac was divine
‘mercy’ (rather than a defense of Isaac’s life), which the father and son earned
by believing that God is merciful. In contrast, he surmises, God allowed
Jephthah to kill his daughter as punishment for failing to believe that God
would mercifully intervene. Augustine says, more consistently, that it was
Jephthah’s vow to kill his daughter that God punished, of which God disap-
proved because he hates human sacrifice as such.
It might be objected against Augustine’s Questions on the Heptateuch inter-
pretation that it has merely replaced a murderous God with a lying God. For
according to Augustine, God told Abraham to kill his son while not actually
intending that he do so. This seems particularly problematic, given that
Augustine wrote two treatises insisting that lying is always wrong. But
note that Augustine’s definition of a ‘lie’ is ‘telling a falsehood with the intent
to deceive.’51 According to this criterion, God was not lying, since a command
is not a proposition, and hence cannot be false.52 Apparently Augustine thinks
that God’s filicidal command should be understood as a case of antiphrasis.53
CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated about 200 years of rabbinic and early Christian analyses of
the Abraham–Isaac episode, and find that only if we make Augustine’s late (c.
420) writing the standard of what is ‘characteristic’ of ‘Hebrew Christian ethics’
can we say that Anscombe’s description of that ethic is true in this case. It is
hasty generalization to speak of a unitary (‘the’) Hebrew–Christian ethic that is
always characterized by its opposition to killing the innocent. Moreover, to
defend Anscombe’s assertion that the Torah teaches that killing the innocent is
always forbidden regardless of its consequences, onewould need to use the kind
50 He does not reason from the ambiguity of the verb, however (the LXX anapherein is
ambiguous), but from the conclusion of the story. On Ambrose and rabbinic
glosses, see e.g. Rueling 2006.
51 In On Lying (c. 395), Augustine says the combination of these two conditions is
sufficient for a lie, but leaves it open whether both are necessary conditions (4.4);
however, in Against Lying (c. 420, contemporaneous withQuestions on the Heptateuch),
Augustine says both are necessary (10.23–4, 12.26), pace Griffiths 2004: 25–31.
52 Diogenes Laertius, Life of Zeno 7.65, 7.68; Byers 2013: 8–22, 29 on Augustine’s reception.
53 See Against Lying 12.26.
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of hermeneutical method employed by Augustine. His approach makes the
Bible’s general prohibitions on killing non-aggressors determinative of the mean-
ing of the particular demand to kill Isaac. This procedure requires an idiosyn-
cratic reading of the Hebrew of Genesis 22:2, or interpreting it as antiphrasis.
Furthermore, we can accept Anscombe’s conceptual claim that this
(Augustinian) defense of the innocent Isaac is grounded in a ‘law conception
of ethics’ only if we equivocate on ‘law.’ By the ‘legal character’ of the ‘Hebrew–
Christian ethic’Anscombe understands divinely given prohibitions.54 In contrast,
Augustine’s ultimate criterion of ethics is ‘eternal law’, which is not divine
legislation but God’s set of simple ideas of justice, prudence, moderation, and
fortitude. These ideas subsist in God irrespective of whether they are positively
given to humans. Augustine’s model, which could be called ‘internalist TO’, is
derived fromNeoplatonic and Stoic conceptions of eternal ‘law’ (ho nomos, lex);55
herein God’s ethical ideas are called ‘law’ because they are immutable and
because living in accord with them yields a consistent and well-ordered pattern
of life. God’s simple ideas when articulated in words are ethical axioms and
definitions (for instance, ‘justice is giving what is deserved’);56 these are to be
applied variously in differing circumstances.57 The proposition ‘Killing the
innocent is unjust’ is always true because ‘innocent’ specifies the relevant
circumstance.58 Augustine does think that a comprehensive divine positive
law (lex generalis) ‘Do not kill the innocent’ was issued at a particular time and
recorded in the Torah.59 But he holds that the function of this and more
particular decrees such as ‘Do not kill children as sacrifices’ was to inform
people who happened to be ignorant about what objective justice entails,
rather than to be the ultimate criterion of rightness and wrongness.60
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